New authorship of protestors in Umbrella Movement

Guest blog by Carmen Tong, Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong

A discussion of the diverse role that young people played in the Umbrella Movement and the problems and potentials involved in youth-led politics.

Figure 1: Young protesters

Young people in Hong Kong today, and probably young people everywhere, have long been stereotyped with an apparent lack of interest in politics. Frequently accompanying this stereotype is a debate on generational shifts in young people’s political interests and the weakening of their participation in formal political events. In the recent Umbrella Movement, however, these stereotypes were shattered. Statistically, 61% of the protestors were age 29 or below, and only 15% had never previously participated in any rally, protest or demonstration (1). In other words, not only was the Umbrella Movement led by young people (the two student groups Scholarism and HKFS), it was also a social movement dominated by the younger cohorts who were not novices in social activism.

While it was the student leaders who caught the international and local spotlight as the organisers of the Umbrella Movement, many other young people engaged with the movement in a variety of ways – sitting in and sleeping over, attending public lectures and discussions,volunteering their time to assist with supplies arrangement and cleaning the streets, reading and studying, creating symbolic artefacts. At times these youthful engagements were the cause of negative publicity – a hotpot gathering and street football event created accusations of sabotage and were immediately stopped by other protestors. These diverse actions could be seen to indicate lack of solidarity but multiple goals and interests are always the norm in a social movement. The ‘dare to be different’ attitude represents the spirit of the young but such types of protests beyond orderly bounds is still deemed radical to many in Hong Kong.

The pluralistic actions in the movement were further fanned by young people’s use of social media, by protestors or ‘keyboard fighters’ alike. Students from mainland China, aiming to seep the news through the Internet blockade of the movement imposed by the Chinese government, used puns and allusions in Weibo and Wechat (the Chinese version of Twitter and a counterpart of What’sApp respectively) to reach friends and family behind the Great Firewall. Local students created Facebook pages (from news verification to political reform concern groups [1] [2]), participated in translation for multilingual updates, and organised aid and resources for other protestors by using Google Documents. Over the course of the Umbrella Movement, independent web media gained unprecedented support in terms of attention (likes and share) and provision of clues, photos and analysis by young netizens (2). Although acting individually, young people have collectively made the Internet a new dimension of the public sphere where everyone executes his/her citizenship by being a citizen journalist.

The young protestors not only engaged with the Umbrella Movement in pluralistic ways, they also had different interpretations of the nature and direction of involvement. One of my students wrote about having a transformative experience in the movement, from being a [passive] participant in the sit-in to active social deliberation and lobbying – by running a Facebook page with a few friends. This redefinition of the active-passive dichotomy seems odd at first glance but it truly makes perfect sense – she is the one in charge of the Facebook page she created while she was merely a participant, an observer, or a follower in the ‘real’ scenes of the Umbrella Movement. This may also give a hint as to the disputes over the ‘big stage’ in the movement – with some protestors proclaiming to demolish or abandon the central stage set up by the organisers, in both a real and symbolic sense. In late November, some protestors started questioning the role and function of the central organisers. The divide then turned to fragmentary attempts to remove the street barricades around the central stage in Admiralty in early December and climaxed with the setting up of a new student group, Student Front, that stressed a non-withdrawal stance on occupy and would ‘counter violence with force’ when necessary (3). While the disputes developed into debates of leadership, organisation and conspiracy, I believe it is a signal to understand anew the young generations’ interpretation of subjectivity and collective identity in social movements. It is clear that young protestors in the Umbrella Movement have a new authorship of thinking and acting as protestors. Yet their decentralised actions are nonetheless brought together by a collective cause. Their collective opposition to the ‘fake’ universal suffrage proposal was the uniting force that triggered them into action; it is also the same uniting force that channeled them into all kinds of different actions. The collective identity of ‘Hong Kong protestors’ was constructed and realised by their pluralistic experiences over the course of the movement where sameness and differences were both contained. The diversified, plural and decentered interests and actions are the essence of the ‘Hong Kong protestors’ identity, as well as the key elements of the ‘genuine’ democracy that the umbrella community, and their like-minded comrades in Hong Kong, were and will, keep fighting for.

Dr Carmen Tong is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, with research interests in media and cultural studies, student culture, identities, gender and sexuality. She has a PhD in Sociology from the University of Hong Kong. Further information available here: http://www.sociodep.hku.hk/html/ppl_teach_carman.html 

Notes

(1) A study was conducted in the three protest areas (Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok) by a team led by two PhD candidates in political studies during 20th to 26th October. 1,562 people were surveyed with a response rate of 97%. The analysis was published in a local newspaper (Ming Pao) on 29th November. A copy of the report can also be found here (in Chinese): http://1in99percent.blogspot.hk/2014/11/blog-post_130.html?spref=fb

(2) InMedia HK summarised their experience in the Umbrella Movement. Their Facebook page had 180 thousands followers before the movement. The figure rose to 390 thousands by 12th November. http://www.inmediahk.net/node/1028475a (in Chinese)

(3) Related disputes and the setting up of Student Front were reported only by Hong Kong’s local media like Apple Daily News, Oriental News and Hong Kong Economics Journal. (in Chinese)
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20141123/18944944 (23rd November 2014)
http://the-sun.on.cc/cnt/news/20141202/00407_006.html (2nd December 2014)
http://www2.hkej.com/instantnews/current/article/949580/ (7th December 2914)
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/realtime/news/20141211/53216837 (11th December 2014)

Politics of belonging under the Umbrella, Part 2

Guest blog by Beatrice Lam, Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong

A reflection on the role of mainland Chinese in the Umbrella movement, and the tensions exposed between mainlanders and Hong Kong people in the process

In Part 1, I talked about some of the negative responses of mainland students to the Umbrella Movement. What struck me more, however, were the views from those who sided with the protesters. They appreciated what the protesters were doing. They witnessed the spirit of Hong Kong, and saw what marked Hong Kong as different from the PRC. They did not participate in the sit-ins, protests, or ‘shopping tours’, however, and found themselves to be the outsiders of the movement because they are not Heunggongyahn. Moreover, they felt that even if Hongkongers could successfully fight for universal suffrage, it would mean little to them, and to people in mainland China, for the PRC wouldn’t change. In other words, they do not see themselves belong to the Umbrella community; they do not see they have any role to play in the movement.

To be truthful, there were local protesters who actively excluded mainlanders from sites of occupation. They taunted or swore at persons who were presumed to be mainlanders (e.g. because of their accent), even if these persons were fully supportive of the movement. One should also be reminded that protesters from mainland might choose to deliberately make themselves invisible by wearing masks, shades and/or caps as they busied themselves around the occupation sites, for fear of being captured on the camera. This has the unfortunate effect of further marginalizing their voice in the movement.

The antipathy of some local protesters towards the presence of mainlanders should be understood in the context of China-Hong Kong integration. From imported labour in the 1980s, female spouses and children since the 1990s, to the more recent border-crossing of tourists, students and professional migrants, mainlanders have always been seen as different, if not inferior, to ‘local’ Hongkongers[2] – a drain on public resources, invaders of local space, and a threat to local culture and identity. The narrowing of the economic gap between Hong Kong and China notwithstanding, cultural boundaries continue to be redrawn as Hongkongers try to reassert their Heunggongyahn identity against the increasing political intervention from Beijing. So people say: Mainlanders are uncivilized, because they eat on the MTR, pee in the street, and spoil the children[3]. We can be proud of our freedom of speech and press and the rule of law in Hong Kong; you, mainlanders, are brainwashed[4]. That the SAR government sought an extended public consultation about the revision of the anti-discrimination ordinance, with the aim to better protect mainland Chinese persons in Hong Kong, only fueled the avalanche of abuses targeted at mainlanders on social media platforms during the movement. It is in this sense that we can understand why mainlanders were found unwelcome in sites of occupation, and why some mainland students see themselves as no more than bystanders of the movement.

The fact that some mainland students see themselves as outsiders in the movement should also be understood in terms of the discrepancies between the respective interpretative frameworks of ‘democracy’ employed in the PRC and among local protesters. Democracy in the PRC is one defined primarily in procedural terms, the practice of which variably configured by local power relations[5] rather than enabling the public to influence and participate in government decision-making. It is also one that must align with the kind of nationalism that has been promoted since the early 1980s: an emphasis on national pride and loyalty to the Chinese Communist state[6]. The pursuit of democracy as represented in the Umbrella Movement is however one geared towards self-determination – deciding how we envision our home and participate in the practice of our visions. It is about enacting our rights as citizens, and is constitutive of our identity as Hongkongers. Some protesters see Hong Kong’s pursuit of democracy as pivotal for the democratization of the PRC, its ‘motherland’; whereas others believe that democracy can only be realized in Hong Kong when ties with mainland China are severed[7]. Either way, such framings of democracy are deemed politically incorrect from Beijing’s perspective: because ties between Hong Kong and her Chinese ‘motherland’ are supposedly eternal and indissoluble, there is no room in the ‘unified’ nation of the PRC for ‘self-determination’ and ‘(local, Hong Kong) identity’. Put simply, pursuing democracy in Hong Kong, through formal political processes or citizens’ participation in the civil society, is ‘unpatriotic’ from Beijing’s point of view. This is why mainland students, with their upbringing in their discursive context of PRC’s nationalism, do not necessarily see the pursuit of democracy in the way local protesters do. We continue to struggle to bond with one another in terms of our identification as political citizens.

‘Hong Kong is the crying baby that gets the milk (from Beijing)’, according to Global Times, the strongly pro-government Chinese tabloid that is known for its promotion of nationalistic sentiments. The Umbrella Movement has been reduced to an act of petulance arising out of Hongkongers’ frustrations with blocked mobility chances (especially among the youth) and paranoia towards mainlanders’ intrusion (in the form of investors, tourists, mothers giving birth in local hospitals, students crossing the border every day, and parallel imports[8]). Nonetheless, there are also those mainlanders who are grateful for having the chance to learn more about tabooed subjects, such as the Cultural Revolution and the June 4^th Tiananmen Massacre, in Hong Kong; they envy the freedom Hongkongers enjoy in political participation, and admire the conviction and courage of local protesters in the Umbrella Movement. For different sorts of reasons and under a variety of circumstances they might have chosen whether or not to participate in the Umbrella Movement – if they did, they often did so beyond the purview of the locals. The sharing of experiences has alerted me to the potential for Hongkongers and mainlanders to bond with each other as actors of a political community. In the process, new collective identities – aside from those of economic agents or patriots, as promulgated in the official ‘national identity’ discourse – can be formed, solidified, and asserted vis-à-vis the Chinese state. Thus, to carry on our fight for democracy, it is not only in the local communities and neighbourhoods where work is to be done. For all the differences experienced between ‘them’ and ‘us’, prejudice and exclusion is ideologically incoherent with the movement’s professed commitment to democracy and celebration of diversity. It is high time for us to confront our politics of belonging and reexamine what our imagined borders mean to us in political terms, in order that we can make the most of what we have learnt from the Umbrella Movement.

Dr Beatrice Lam is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, with research interests in education, social stratification, gender studies, and Hong Kong society. She has a PhD in Sociology from the University of Manchester. Further information available here: http://www.sociodep.hku.hk/html/ppl_teach_beatice.html

Notes

[1] ‘Shopping’ was a repertoire of collective action that was developed in response to the clearing of the Mongkok site of occupation. For an explanation of the inspiration behind, please refer to

https://www.facebook.com/399489936867825/photos/a.399560746860744.1073741831.399489936867825/400139383469547/?type=1&theater

[2] It should be noted that many Hongkongers who self-identify as ‘locals’ or ‘natives’ were former immigrants from mainland China. They see themselves as different from more recent arrivals.

[3] For a discussion of how the antipathy of Hongkongers against mainlanders has developed and evolved since the 1970s, please see:

Mathews, G, Ma, EKW, & Lui, TL (2008) Hong Kong, China : learning to belong to a nation. Chapter 4, 6. Routledge.

Chan, E (2000) Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’ – National Identity in Hong Kong, Government and Opposition, 35(4): 499–519.

For information of the intensifying tensions between Hongkongers and mainlanders, please see:

http://timeout.com.hk/feature-stories/features/50010/the-china-syndrome.html; and

Chan, CK (2014) China as “Other”: Resistance to and ambivalence toward national identity in Hong Kong, China perspectives, 2014(1): 25-34.

[4] For information of how values of freedom of speech, freedom of press and the rule of law serve as the foundation upon which Hongkongers dissociate themselves from mainlanders, please see:

Fung, YHA, & Ma, KW (2007) Negotiating Local & National Identifications: Hong Kong Identity Survey 1996-2006, Asian Journal of Communication, 17(2): 172-185.

[5] This is exemplified in the impediment of democratic governance in villages in rural China, despite the semblance of openness and fairness of their election procedures. For further information, please see:

O’Brien, KJ & Han, R (2009) Path to Democracy? Assessing village elections in China, Journal of Contemporary China 18(60): 359-378.

[6] For further information, please see:

Fairbrother, GP (2003) Toward critical patriotism : student resistance to political education in Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong : Hong Kong University Press.

[7] The former camp is best represented by those who began participating in the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong since the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. They see Hong Kong as sharing the same destiny with China, their motherland, in the road towards democracy. The latter camp is best represented by the supporters of the ‘Hong Kong Autonomy Movement’, who aspire to Hong Kong developing into a democratic, self-governing city-state vis-à-vis an incorrigible, authoritarian PRC.

[8] Please refer to footnote 5 for further information.

Politics of belonging under the Umbrella, Part 1

Guest blog by Beatrice Lam, Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong

A reflection on the role of mainland Chinese in the Umbrella movement, and the tensions exposed between mainlanders and Hong Kong people in the process

Figure 1: Democracy Wall, University of Hong Kong

I do not often come across undergraduate students from mainland China when teaching in Hong Kong. Perhaps just as I saw during my time in the U.K., social sciences is not where you would find many mainland Chinese students. I made friends with the small number that were there; despite this, for all the yum-chas and hotpots, hardly can I recall a dialogue among us about China-Hong Kong relations and politics. I went with friends from Hong Kong to watch the Nobel Prize Award Ceremony live on TV in the university library, the year the imprisoned political dissident Liu Xiaobo won the Peace Prize. Not for one minute had I thought of asking my mainland schoolmates about this, let alone inviting them to come along. And neither did my friends from Hong Kong – it was just the intuitive thing (not) to do. My Heunggongyahn (Hongkonger) identity did not interfere with my friendship with the mainland schoolmates, or our identity work as Chinese in the diasporic space of the UK, but our bond was certainly not based on any political dimensions of our shared Chineseness.

As a result, I am not privy to the thoughts of people from mainland China about Hong Kong, or the more contentious question about Hongkongers’ alleged recalcitrance towards China. I have, however, addressed this issue in classrooms with mainland students. What bothers me is that I have no clue how they receive my teaching. Somehow, I feel that it is unthinking of me not to initiate a conversation outside the classroom if they do not ask or remain silent on the subject. In contrast, local Hong Kong students, at least some of them, have no qualms with criticizing national education as brainwashing, or opining that mainlanders are cultural dupes in tutorial discussion or in their assignments.

It was therefore a surprise that, on September the 29^th, the day after the teargas bombing, I was approached by a mainland student who sought my advice about the role of a responsible social sciences student in the Umbrella Movement. She was vague about what happened that led her to ask this question, but I understood that she had engaged in some unfriendly exchanges with others after her posting of information about the teargas on social media platforms popular in mainland China. We have talked to each other more often since then; from her sharing I began to learn more about perspectives from the mainland. At the same time I heard a lot from local protesters, who had a lot to say about their encounters with mainlanders both inside and outside of the movement. Below I share my observations and thoughts.

First, before concern could be shown and an opinion could be given, mainlanders needed to make sure that nobody would know it was them who was doing the talking. It was unwise to talk to outsiders – such as me, or any average Hongkongers. Some mainland students were eager to circumvent internet censorship so as to get the information about the movement across, even if their messages would only make a fleeting presence online. A greater concern, however, was that when one’s information and view got circulated, one risked being misinterpreted for, say, having politically-incorrect motives in the mere act of transmitting information; particularly as the movement was often constructed and understood in the PRC as a riot. This also explains why another mainland student in my class, otherwise quiet in tutorial discussions regarding the subject matter of the Umbrella Movement, described the protests as riots at one point. With these issues in mind, it makes sense why a mainlander would rather not talk about the movement, or to talk in equivocal terms, for example suggesting that one was neutral about it.

Second, some mainland students suggested that democracy is ultimately geared towards access to economic resources and social welfare. With the information I gathered from students, it is hard to deduce further from this seemingly more utilitarian framing of the movement and democracy itself. Having said that, I am tempted to suggest that from mainland students’ perspective, issues of (political) citizenship, self-governance and identity – the terms in which the movement was framed among local protesters – are irrelevant to (the struggle for) democracy. Letting the people speak? Demonstrating how we make public space ‘public’? Exhibiting why we are ready to make decisions about our city? This is the spirit inherited from past social movements in Hong Kong that sought to protect urban and rural neighbourhoods from demolishment under the pretext of China-Hong Kong integration, and citizens from indoctrination by national education, etc. For mainland students, however, it does not strike them immediately that such visions are part and parcel of the Umbrella Movement. Not only is information of social movements in Hong Kong accessible to few in mainland China, but PRC also has notorious record of silencing political dissidents (via criminalization or house arrests), including those whose democratic ideals are expressed in the mildest manner (e.g., the aforementioned Liu Xiaobo.

Lastly, the utilitarian view of democracy was expressed in another way, but with a strong dose of cynicism. Some mainland students believed that democracy is a smokescreen that helps the state justify its rule. Whether it is genuine democracy or not does not matter; as long as people are convinced of the democratic nature of the state, challenges to the latter’s authority can be minimized; this is precisely what the state is looking for. Another view that became increasingly popular among mainland students as the movement entered into a stalemate was one that democracy is a device with which politicians manipulate the people. The common saying is that protesters were ‘pure’ – i.e., ‘genuine’ – in their initial struggles, but as the movement dragged on they became embroiled in politicking. The movement became corrupted, and was thus no longer worth the support of these mainland students. In Part 2, I will talk about some of the views of mainland students who sided with the protesters.

Dr Beatrice Lam is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong, with research interests in education, social stratification, gender studies, and Hong Kong society. She has a PhD in Sociology from the University of Manchester. Further information available here: http://www.sociodep.hku.hk/html/ppl_teach_beatice.html

Notes

For information of the controversy surrounding the kind of ‘universal suffrage’ stipulated by Beijing, the bone of contention in the Umbrella Movement, please refer to:

https://www.facebook.com/notes/kaza-chan/%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E7%99%BC%E7%94%9F%E4%BB%80%E9%BA%BC%E4%BA%8B%E4%BA%86what-is-happening-to-hk-qa-translation/10152753292993523?pnref=story

Umbrella Sociology

Alistair Fraser

In English, the noun umbrella comes from the Latin umbella, meaning flat-topped flower, and from umbra, meaning shade: a flower that protects. In written Chinese, however, the character used for umbrella is not a noun, but a verb, ‘to block’ (遮, ze). While these roots share a common idea – of defence and safety – they also allude to divergent meanings. One is static and organic, the other mobile and proactive. Both represent something important about the protests.

While some – particularly international – reports have depicted the Umbrella Movement as being relatively homogenous and cohesive, the protests have in fact been extremely heterogenous. As the contributions to this issue demonstrate, participants have been focused on action rather than reaction; on individual acts of resistance rather than a unifying narrative. Indeed, Cantonese-speaking friends tell me that few people actually used the terms ‘umbrella’ or ‘movement’ in everyday discussions. Conversations are more grounded in action: ‘Did you occupy Admiralty?’ ‘Did you sit-in?’ This gap between representation and reality shows the value of sociology in making sense of unfolding social and political events.

In 1959, the sociologist C Wright Mills published a now-famous book called The Sociological Imagination. In it, Mills outlines a way of thinking that links the micro-level of everyday life with the macro-level of structural change, between what he calls ‘private troubles’ and ‘public issues‘. By shuttling back and forth between these levels, Mills thought it possible to relate large-scale political and economic shifts to personal decision-making. Cultivating this approach means not only an ability to analyse the emergent aspects of social life – of history ‘in-the-making’ – but also in grasping the significance of individual action in altering its path. In demonstrating the contingent nature of life, Mills thought that sociology could promote social activism.

Fifty-five years later, this way of thinking remains an indispensable tool in understanding current social change and, importantly, one not reserved solely for academics. In many ways the Umbrella Movement involved the rapid development of a kind of mass sociological imagination, in which a direct connection between individual choice and structural change became obvious for a sizable population. The private troubles of individuals, families and communities became fused with the public issue of political representation, and it became clear that action was possible.

The forms of involvement varied tremendously – from steadfast occupiers to online translators, quiet contributors to logistical coordinators – but were nonetheless unified under the banner of collective action. In this sense, the English roots of umbella and umbra feel particularly apt – these actions represent the flowering of an organic form of grassroots politics that is both powerful and protective. This unifying umbrella brought together people from varying backgrounds and political stripes, and created space for a range of minority groups to have a voice.

Indeed, what has often been missed is that this particular social movement has been a particularly social movement. Though most came to the protest sites for the politics, many stayed for the community. In a city so keenly focused on individual success, where living spaces are so incredibly cramped, the occupy sites were a revelation. Collectively, participants redefined the space – from a spaghetti-junction choked with taxis, buses and fumes to a spontaneous space of quiet defiance and interdependent conviction. The expansive spaces of the protests sites also proved to be fertile soil for the growth of creativity, as art and resistance came together in the form of sculpture, banners, and DIY post-its.

Peering beneath this umbrella, however, reveals a complex range of social divisions: the creation of community is both inclusive and exclusive. During the height of the protests, suddenly you were in or out, for or against, yellow or blue. In this sense, the Chinese verb for umbrella, ‘to block’, helps to clarify more than the English. The protests were mobile, active, defiant – in turn, tensions based on gender and social class became exposed, social boundaries were solidified, rumour and conspiracy flourished. What this shows is that, among other things, social movements must be understood not just at a broad level of abstraction, but at the level of the individual; they are social, human struggles above all.

And this, to me, speaks of why we need sociology. Making sense of major world events through their impact on daily life; shuttling between history, biography and culture; seeking out the cracks between representation and reality: this is the stuff of the sociological imagination. C Wright Mills would, I’m sure, have approved of the Umbrella Movement, as a powerful demonstration of both the ‘task’ and the ‘promise’ of sociology that he spoke of so passionately More than asking what sociology can do for the Umbrella Movement, though, we might ask what the Umbrella Movement can do for sociology. We might, for instance, think of a form of ‘umbrella sociology’ that is both protective yet engaged, unifying yet mobile, civic yet creative. Now that’s an umbrella I’d like to get under.

This blog is an edited version of the article ‘Umbrella Sociology’, published in the International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter, No.70, Spring 2015. Republished with permission. For the original article, which introduced a special feature on the Umbrella Movement, see: http://www.iias.nl/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL70_FULL.pdf

Post-90s Youth and the #umbrellarevolution in Hong Kong

Alistair Fraser

Figure 1: Umbrella revolution

The umbrella is a unique cultural object in Hong Kong. Used as a shade from the beating sun, as a shield to ward off the wind; to force your way through the busy streets, or to save a seat in a crowded restaurant; they are bought and lost, or broken and replaced, on a weekly basis. On rainy days, from above, they can be seen blossoming in every colour along the packed shopping areas. In the last few days, however, umbrellas have taken on a new usage – as protection from the jets of pepper-spray that have been aimed in the faces of protesters. In turn, they have been interpreted as weapons by riot police, and forcibly grabbed. In the process, the humble umbrella has become a totem for the Occupy Central movement that is currently taking life in the city: the so-called umbrella revolution. Umbrellas – and yellow ribbons, the other symbol of the protest – can now be seen across the city, prompting the playful Facebook group 遍地開遮 Umbrella Everywhere! advising citizens to ‘occupy’ space with their umbrellas wherever they go.

Yesterday morning, I joined the protest. I had no umbrella, but what I saw astonished me. Thousands upon thousands of Hongkongers, young and old, crowding the roads surrounding the central government offices. Collectively they redefined the space – from a spaghetti-junction choked with taxis, buses and fumes to a spontaneous space of quiet defiance and interdependent conviction. Determined young people weaved through the crowds with shopping-trolleys of water; makeshift first-aid tents stood alongside caches of food and ubiquitous umbrellas; crews cleared litter and gathered plastic for recycling; international film-crews jostled to capture the flowering of a peaceful civil disobedience. As the day wore on, more and more people gathered on the streets: in marked contrast to the ugly scenes of teargas from the previous night, the sight was breathtaking. The spectacle of many thousands, holding lights and mobile phones aloft, can be seen here.

As the eyes of the global media have quickly gathered on Hong Kong, it may feel like this chain of events has occurred spontaneously, but it’s been a long time coming. Occupy Central has quietly been gathering support for the past 18 months – deliberations have at times felt protracted – through successive stages of consultation, polling and recommendation. The civil referendum run by the University of Hong Kong in June 2014 garnered nearly 800,000 participants. Before, during and since this build-up, Hong Kong’s young people have played a central role. The Scholarism movement, which mobilised around efforts to introduce a programme of moral and national education in 2011, instigated a campaign of hunger strikes and demonstrations. One of the leaders of the student movement, unassuming firebrand Joshua Wong – the subject of a recent documentary, Lessons in Dissent – has at the tender age of seventeen played a leading role in the movement.

The sociologist Lui Tai-lok wrote in 2007 of the ‘four generations’ of Hong Kong people that shaped the social and cultural landscape of the city. At the time, the so-called post-80s generation were making waves through political protest on broad-ranging issues relating to environmentalism, inequality and human rights (this report details some of the shifts in attitudes that underpinned the politicisation of post-80s youth). Scholarism now represents a new generation of post-90s youth politics: a young, fearless, social-media savvy generation whose objectives are focused squarely on democracy. In this spirit, the Occupy movement has inspired solidarity protests around the world, including Glasgow.

As a symbol of this continuity and change, the umbrella feels particularly apt. The word comes from the Latin umbella, meaning flat-topped flower, and from umbra, meaning shade – a flower that protects. Whether there is revolution to accompany it or not, the #umbrellarevolution represents the blossoming of a powerful, protective, and flexible form of youthful post-90s politics that bodes well for the future of Hong Kong.

The Big, Big Debate and ‘the cat in the hat’

Guest blog by Angus Dixon

In the run-up to Scotland’s Referendum on Independence, there have been several attempts to engage young voters by mainstream media. The BBC’s Generation 2014, for example, followed 50 first time voters over a year, in a documentary style highly influenced by Michael Apted’s seminal 7-UP series, and the plan is to return to this generation at various junctures over the coming years. As well taking part in a series of television documentaries (Being Sixteen in 2014), Generation 2014 participants were also involved across the rest of the BBC’s output as the ‘voice of young Scotland’.

The Big, Big Debate

Perhaps the most innovative and headline grabbing of the BBC events was The Big, Big Debate recorded in the newly built 12,000 capacity SSE Hydro one week prior to the referendum. This ambitious programme was based on a relatively traditional panel debate format – the difference being that there were 8,000 young people from schools across Scotland in the audience. Presented by BBC Scotland’s James Cook, The Big Big Debate saw 16- and 17-year-old first time voters quiz key politicians from both campaigns on the issues that mattered most to them.

Figure 1: The BBC’s Big Big Debate, hosted at Glasgow’s SSE Hydro

The panel for the programme was Patrick Harvie and the SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon on behalf of the Yes campaign and Galloway and the Scottish Conservative leader Ruth Davidson.

Teenage twitterstorm

Before and during the show, the BBC asked the audience to post their comments on Facebook and tweet using #BigBigDebate, a move that was to generate humour and admiration. Within about 10 minutes the hashtag began to trend on Twitter and soon other social media users were directed to the debate.

The initial comments were about having to wait too long and the heat inside the venue. “Waving paper in front of my face instead of clapping otherwise I’ll die,” wrote Hannah Clifford. “Arms pure sore from waving a piece of paper in ma face for like 3 hours straight,” added another user. Ross Fergusson was even more cutting: “Bored as f*ck any only came for a day off didny ken it was gonna be like a sauna in here.”

But that was merely the curtain raiser to main debate and George Galloway’s decision to wear a fedora and his previous impersonation of a cat on Celebrity Big Brother led to him being dubbed ‘The cat in the hat’. “George Galloway’s hat is enough to make me vote Yes,” wrote Ellie McClarty. “George Galloway does Indiana Jones,” remarked another user.

Figure 2: Gorgeous George in his Fedora

But as the jokes subsided it was the young people’s level of awareness of the issues that began to gain attention. But the tweeters were able to move beyond the usual abuse and inane chatter that characterises Twitter for adults, let along teenagers: “If you vote yes, you’ll get Alex Salmond. No we won’t! Can’t believe I just heard that from a politician” tweeted MaryLou.

As Julie Davidson commented in The Herald:

I thought young people’s concerns would different from the usual questions, but no. They weren’t stuck on tuition fees or job opportunities but branched out into the bigger picture and were perfectly coherent and confident in doing so. Neither were they tainted with the weariness and cynicism which plagues so many of us in political debate which suggests our bright young people should have the vote in every election.

On Twitter, Rachel Fulton reflected, “Regardless of which way we vote, we should be excited at how engaged Scots young people now are in politics”. Likewise, Louise Macdonald commented: “So proud of young Scots after #BigBigDebate – articulate and thoughtful. A strong case for the franchise to be extended”.

Figure 3: Twitter praise for young voters

 

Engaging and representing youth

The show itself was a roaring success. Not only did it capture an audience share of 30.4% in Scotland, almost unheard of for a political debate, it actively engaged young voters within and outwith the Hydro. Equally importantly, it represented young Scots in an engaging manner. Their thoughtful questions drew heaps of praise from the audience at home, and gave lie to the myth that young people today are politically apathetic.

Angus Dixon is a freelance television producer, journalist and educator (who produced The Referendum Debate series for BBC Scotland and has worked on Panorama, Frontline Scotland, The Last Word with Nicky Campbell and Words With Wark.

Young Voters and the Referendum on Scottish Independence

Susan Batchelor (@SusanABatchelor)

The Referendum on Scottish Independence

Today Scotland is holding a Referendum on whether to become an independent country or to remain part of the United Kingdom. With the vote extended to 16- and 17-year-olds, it will be the first time that under-18s in the UK have had the franchise on a major matter of state. Young people aged 16 to 24 make up approximately 12 per cent of the Scottish population. With polls indicating a close result, votes cast by young people may make all the difference.

Engaging young voters

Concerns about the decline of young people’s political participation have been a common feature of almost all Western democracies in recent years. In the UK, voter turnout amongst 18- to 24-year-olds has been declining since 1997, dipping to its lowest point in 2005, at 38.2%. As a result, there have been significant efforts to engage young people in the run up to the Scottish Referendum – from schools, colleges and universities, youth groups and other civic and voluntary organisations, as well as the campaigns themselves. The Scottish Youth Parliament, for example, have facilitated impartial ‘democracy days’ across the country, encouraging young people to debate key issues and start discussing them with family and friends.

Figure 1: Yes Campaign takes lead in Scottish Referendum – with likes and selfies

Social media has also played an important role in engaging young voters. In the period 1^st August to 8^th September 2014, Facebook saw more than 10 million interactions (posts, comments, and likes) concerning the Referendum, including over 8.5 million interactions in Scotland. According to Elizabeth Linder, Facebook’s politics and government specialist, ‘Studies show that when people see their Facebook friends talking about voting, they are more likely to vote themselves’. Given that young people aged 16 to 25 years are the most active group on social media, it is no surprise that both the Yes Scotland and Better Together campaigns have utilized the platform to reach out to young voters.

Increased interest and participation

The available evidence suggests that these endeavours have largely been successful, prompting greater interest in and engagement with politics amongst young people in Scotland. A record 4.29 million people have registered to vote in the Referendum, with those aged 16 and 17 making up more than 100,000 of this figure. In other words, 97% of the total number of people eligible has registered to vote. According to The Scotsman newspaper, the most recent polls indicate that 79% of 16- to 24-year-olds living in Scotland are certain to vote. Political interest is also high. According to research published by the University of Edinburgh in June of this year, 13% of 14- to 17-year-olds living in Scotland report ‘a great deal’ of interest in politics, with a further 46% saying that the are interested ‘to some extent’. Only 9% of 14- to 17-year-olds said that they had no interest in politics (compared to 13% of adults in the 2013 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey).

Figure 2: Some of Scotland’s young voters

Issues that are important for young people as they consider what way to vote include education and employment, as opposed to national identity and associated emotions. According to the University of Edinburgh research, younger Scots tend to have a much more multi-layered sense of their own identity than those aged 18 years and over: just 12% of 14- to 17-year-olds described themselves as ‘Scottish, not British’, compared to 35% of 18- to 24-year-olds and 23% of adults as a whole. Forty-five per cent said they regarded themselves as equally Scottish and British, far above the 22% of 18- to 24-year-olds or 30% of all adults. More significant, are concerns relating to education and the economy, including currency, welfare and pensions. The opportunity to protect free education is a major concern, prompting some young people to back independence. Concern for jobs, on the other hand, combined with worries over financial security are pushing others towards a no vote.

Future prospects

Whatever the result of today’s Referendum on Independence, the real success of the campaign has been the engagement of young voters. Hundreds of thousands of young people across Scotland are now geared up to participate in a historic moment of self-determination. We need to harness this renewed interest and enthusiasm for future elections.